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Summary: We consider economies with additively separable utility func-
tions and give conditions for the two-agents case under which the existence
of sunspot equilibria is equivalent to the occurrence of the transfer paradox.
This equivalence enables us to show that sunspots cannot matter if the ini-
tial economy has a unique spot market equilibrium and there are only two
commodities or if the economy has a unique equilibrium for all distributions
of endowments induced by asset trade. For more than two agents the equiv-
alence breaks and we give an example for sunspot equilibria even though the
economy has a unique equilibrium for all distributions of endowments induced
by asset trade.
1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to clarify the relation between the existence of
sunspot equilibria and the uniqueness of spot market equilibria for economies
with intrinsically complete asset markets. In these economies Pareto-efficient
allocations can be attained as competitive equilibria even without asset trade.
[5] introduce their famous paper ”Do sunspots matter?” with the ques-
tion: ”What is the best strategy for playing the stock market? Should one
concentrate on fundamentals or should one instead focus on the psychology of
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the market ”. The sunspot literature, originating from [4] contributes to this
question by emphasizing that even if all market participants are completely
rational (in the sense that they are maximizing expected utility functions and
have rational expectations), still market outcomes can depend on the psy-
chology of the market. The latter is modelled in the sunspot literature as
a publicly observed exogenous random event, nicknamed ”sunspot”. Hence,
even without referring to any kind of bounded rationality the best way of
playing the stock market will not only be based on fundamentals! The sim-
plest case in which this reasoning can be shown to be correct arises when the
economic fundamentals allow for multiple equilibria. The sunspot is then used
as a coordination device. In this case sunspot equilibria are similar to corre-
lated equilibria studied in the game theory literature. The point of this paper
is to analyze whether this is all sunspot equilibria are about, i.e. whether
sunspots matter even when spot market equilibria are unique. Throughout
the paper we assume that agents are strictly risk averse. Hence if utilities
differ across sunspot states then sunspots matter because sunspot equilibria
are Pareto-inefficient (cf. [5]).
We show that for the case of two agents, with utility functions being
concave transformations of additively separable functions, the existence of
sunspot equilibria is equivalent to the occurrence of the transfer paradox. As
an application of this equivalence we demonstrate that the transfer paradox
can occur even if the economic fundamentals can be represented by a repre-
sentative consumer, which in particular implies the uniqueness of equilibria in
the initial economy. We also show that the occurrence of sunspot equilibria is
indeed subject to the same critique as the occurrence of the transfer paradox.
In a model with two commodities, sunspot equilibria can only occur if the
initial equilibrium (the equilibrium without asset trade) is not unique. More-
over, if as in the case of Cobb-Douglas economies, uniqueness of equilibria is
guaranteed for (almost) all distributions of endowments then sunspot equilib-
ria cannot occur at all. Then we show, again using the equivalence between
the two paradoxes, that nevertheless the occurrence of sunspot equilibria does
not need to be based on the exogenous selection among multiple equilibria.
We construct a simple example in which the equilibrium of any sunspot state
is not an equilibrium of any other sunspot state. This example is based on
the idea that financial markets may specify incomplete insurance against the
uncertainty that they induce. That is to say, in this example asset payoffs are
sunspot-dependent and incomplete.
Constructing explicit numerical examples in general equilibrium models is
usually done for a class of economies with a simple enough structure so that
excess demand functions remain manageable. Computable general equilibrium
models (cf. [35]), examples for the occurrence of the transfer paradox ([27, 6,
7, 34, 14], etc), and examples for multiple equilibria ([24, 25, 20, 21]) therefore
use the class of CES-utility functions. The class of utility functions assumed
in this paper (monotonic transformations of additively separable functions)
includes CES-functions. Keeping this assumption we broaden our analysis by
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looking into the case of more than two agents (countries). We find that the
occurrence of the transfer paradox is then no longer sufficient for the existence
of sunspot equilibria. Moreover, we give an example with Cobb-Douglas utility
functions and sunspot-dependent assets in which sunspots matter even though
there are unique equilibria for all distributions of endowments the economy
can arrive at using asset trade.
To get the intuition for our results, note that a sunspot equilibrium con-
sists of a set of spot market equilibria (one for each sunspot state) where
the endowments of each spot market economy are obtained by redistributions
resulting from the equilibrium asset market allocation. Hence an unfavorable
redistribution of endowments as it occurs exogenously in the transfer para-
dox can be derived from asset trade only if the resulting income transfers can
be made compatible with the asset allocation the agents choose. In the asset
market equilibrium the sum across states (adjusted by the common proba-
bility beliefs) of the products of marginal utilities and wealth transfers has
to be equal to zero for all agents. Since marginal utilities are non-negative,
this requires first of all that all agents find some state with positive income
transfer and some with negative income transfer arising from asset trade.
Moreover, supposing that marginal utilities are inversely ordered than utility
levels, this requires that for some state in which an agent receives a negative
income transfer he has a higher utility than for some state with a non-negative
income transfer. This is achieved by the transfer paradox. In a sense the trans-
fer paradox then ”crosses the order” of marginal utility levels across sunspot
states. Note that otherwise all states with negative income transfers would be
weighted higher than those with positive income transfer and the probabil-
ity adjusted sum of marginal utilities times income transfers cannot equalize
zero. Hence, provided marginal utilities are inversely related to utility levels
the transfer paradox is necessary for sunspots to matter. Moreover, by ap-
propriate choice of the agents’ risk aversions we can also show the converse,
i.e. that a slightly stronger version of the transfer paradox is indeed sufficient
for sunspots to matter. The role of assuming concave transformations of ad-
ditive separable utilities in this reasoning is to guarantee that indeed higher
marginal utilities are implied by lower utility levels. This relation is neither
true without concavity of the transformation, without additive separability or
with more than two agents. In particular, with more than two agents, the ex-
istence of sunspot equilibria is no longer tied to the occurrence of the transfer
paradox. Of course, a rigorous argument for this intuition will be given once
we have made precise the setup of the model considered.
The question concerning the relation of the existence of sunspot equilibria
and the uniqueness of spot market equilibria has also been addressed by [29]
and [16], for example. One of our results shows that the construction suggested
by [29] can indeed be used to show that, using asset trade, an economy can
arrive at an endowment distribution for which there are multiple equilibria
even though for the initial distribution of endowments equilibria are unique.
Note that in [29] it is not shown that ”trading towards multiplicity” can be
4 Hens et al.
done by starting at an initial distribution of endowments with a unique spot
market equilibrium because it is not shown that the equilibrium of the initial
economy is unique. Also the Cobb-Douglas example in which sunspot equilib-
ria exist even though spot market equilibria are unique (for all distributions
one can arrive at using asset trade) clarifies a confusion that has recently come
up in [19] and [3]. [19] has claimed that such an example is possible, but [3]
have shown that for the particular parameter values [19] has chosen this is
not true! Note that the sunspot equilibrium [3] suggest to consider instead of
[19]’s example, sunspots do not matter because agents are not risk averse. Our
results in this paper show that the problem in [19] has nothing to do with the
parameter values chosen. It arises because [19] considered an economy with
only two agents. As we show here, with three agents the construction in [19]
is actually possible.
Finally, note that the relation of sunspot equilibria and uniqueness of
spot market equilibria has also been studied in economies in which a Pareto-
efficient allocation cannot be obtained without asset trade. These types of
economies originate in the famous ”leading example” of [4]. With first period
consumption, asset trade may occur because of intertemporal substitution
and as a by-product this may introduce extrinsic uncertainty as [4] has first
pointed out.
[16] study an intrinsically incomplete economy a la [4], however with real
instead of nominal assets. In our paper assets also have real payoffs but the
result of [16], who show the existence of sunspot equilibria for a strong unique-
ness assumptions on the underlying economy, does not apply to our setting
because it relies on first period consumption. Also for the same reason the tech-
nique developed by [16] is not applicable here because they control the agents‘
utility gradients both by perturbing the utility functions and by changing the
level of first-period consumption.
In the next section we outline the model. Then we give the definitions
of the transfer paradox and of sunspot equilibria. Thereafter we prove our
result establishing the equivalence of the transfer paradox and the occurrence
of sunspot equilibria. Section 4 applies this result to derive some new insights
both for sunspot equilibria and also for the transfer paradox. Also in Section 4
we also show some implications for the existence of sunspot equilibria when
spot market equilibria are unique. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
We first outline the sunspot model. The transfer paradox will then be embed-
ded into this model by a new interpretation of the sunspot states.
There are two periods. In the second period, one of s = 1, . . . , S states
of the world occurs. In the first period assets are traded. Consumption only
takes place in the second period. This assumption is important here because
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otherwise the sunspot model cannot be linked to the atemporal transfer para-
dox model. There are i = 1, . . . , I agents and l = 1, . . . , L commodities in
each state. States are called sunspot states because the agents’ characteris-
tics within the states, i.e. the agents’ endowments ωi ∈ Xi and their utility
functions ui : Xi → IR, do not depend on them. Xi is a closed convex subset
of IRL+ which denotes agent i’s consumption set. In the sunspot literature the
agents’ characteristics [(ui, ωi)i=1,...,I ] are called the economic fundamentals.
Throughout this paper we make the
Assumption 1 (Additive Separability)All agents’ von Neumann-Mor-
genstern utility functions ui are monotonic transformations of additively sep-
arable functions, i.e. ui(xi1, . . . , x
i
L) = f
i(
∑L
l=1 g
i
l(x
i
l)) for all x
i ∈ Xi, where
the functions f i and gil , l = 1, . . . , L are assumed to be twice continuously dif-
ferentiable, strictly increasing and the gil are concave. Moreover, we assume
that for every agent i at least L−1 of the functions gil are strictly concave
and that for all commodities l there is some i for which gil is strictly concave.
Finally, ui, is assumed to be concave.
Note that the assumptions on the functions gil guarantee strict quasi-concavity
of the function ui. (Strict-) Concavity of ui however also depends on the
monotonic transformation f i. The class of utility functions covered by as-
sumption 1 includes all utility functions that are commonly used in ap-
plied general equilibrium theory. In particular, the case of CES utilities,
ui(xi) =
∑L
l=1
(
(αil)
1−ρi(xil)
ρi
)1/ρi
, defined for all i = 1, . . . , I on Xi =
{x ∈ IRL++|ui(x) ≥ ui(ωi)}, for some ωi ∈ IRL++ and some 0 < αil < 1,
l = 1, . . . , L and ρi < 1, is covered by this assumption. Also across states
agents are assumed to have additive separable utility functions:
Assumption 2 (Expected Utility)For all agents, i = 1, . . . , I, the ex-
pected utility functions, defining preferences over state contingent consumption
xi(s) ∈ IRL, s = 1, . . . , S are given by
Eui(xi(1), . . . , xi(S)) =
S∑
s=1
pi(s)hi(ui(xi(s))) ∀xi ∈ (Xi)S ,
where the hi are twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and con-
cave functions. Moreover, Eui is assumed to be strictly concave.
An important subclass of economies arises if the von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility functions hi(f i(
∑
l g
i
l(x
i
l))) are concave transformations of additively
separable functions, i.e. if assumption 1 holds and the composite functions
hi ◦ f i are concave.
Assumption 3 (E.U. with Concave Additive Separability)Assump-
tion 1 and 2 hold and the composite functions hi ◦ f i are concave.
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To include CES-functions under assumption 3, the convex transformation
f i(y) = y1/ρ
i
has to be transformed by a sufficiently concave function hi
so that hi ◦ f i is concave. However, to satisfy assumptions 1 and 2 one could
choose a strictly concave function that makes the expected utility concave
without requiring concavity of hi ◦ f i. Unfortunately, this subtle difference
will be important for our paper, as we will give examples with CES-utilities,
satisfying assumptions 1 and 2 but not 3, in which sunspot equilibria occur.
In the first period agents can trade j = 1, . . . , J , real assets with payoffs
Aj(s) ∈ IRL if state s occurs. We denote asset prices by q ∈ IRJ . Agent i’s
portfolio of assets is denoted by θi ∈ IRJ . Note that all asset payoffs are real,
i.e. in terms of commodities. Moreover, we allow for sunspot depended asset
payoffs. There is an impressive strand of the sunspot literature originating
from [4] in which asset payoffs are nominal. In this literature asset payoffs
measured in real terms differ across sunspot states if and only if sunspots
matter. The same is effectively also the case in our setting: Supposing spot
market equilibria are unique the equilibrium transfers across states measured
in real terms depend on sunspots if and only if sunspots matter.
All equilibria we consider in this setting are special cases of competitive
equilibria, which are defined in
Definition 1 (Competitive Equilibrium). A competitive equilibrium is an
allocation (
?
xi,
?
θi), i = 1, .., I, and a price system (
?
p,
?
q) such that
1. For all agents i = 1, .., I:
(
?
xi,
?
θi) ∈ argmaxxi∈Xi,θi∈IRJ
∑S
s=1 pi(s)h
i(ui(xi(s))) s.t.
?
q · θi ≤ 0 and
?
p(s) · xi(s) ≤ ?p(s) · ωi + ?p(s) ·A(s)θi for all s = 1, . . . , S.
2.
∑I
i=1
?
xi(s) =
∑I
i=1 ω
i for all s = 1, . . . , S.
3.
∑I
i=1
?
θi = 0.
Remark 1. To simplify the exposition when analyzing competitive equilibrium
allocations we restrict attention to interior allocations, i.e. to allocations xi
in the interior of Xi, i = 1, . . . , I. A sufficient assumption guaranteeing the
interiority of allocations is to impose that the functions f i and gil satisfy the
Inada condition according to which the marginal utility tends to infinity at
the boundary of the consumption set Xi ⊂ IRL+.
Note that a competitive equilibrium consists of S spot market equilibria (one
for each spot market economy with endowments ωˆi(s) = ωi+A(s)θi) together
with an asset market equilibrium by which the ex-post endowments of the spot
markets are generated. It will be convenient to introduce the spot-market
economy of the economic fundamentals as a point of reference. To abbreviate
notations we therefore let this economy be the spot market economy in the
spot s = 0. Finally, note that when showing the existence of sunspot equilibria
we allow to choose the characteristics not fixed by the economic fundamentals,
the sunspot extension, appropriately. The sunspot extension consist of the
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probabilities of the sunspot states pi, the asset structureA and the risk aversion
functions hi. The sunspot equilibria are robust with respect to perturbations
of these characteristics however sunspot equilibria will not exist for all possible
choices of the sunspot extension.
This finishes the description of the model.
3 Sunspot Equilibria and the Transfer Paradox
In the sunspot literature agents transfer commodity bundles across sunspot
states by trading assets. In the international trade literature one thinks of
transfers of commodities arising from donations. Each sunspot state will later
on be associated with different such donations. The transfer paradox is said
to occur if some agent donates some of his resources to some other agent and
the recipients utility decreases. In the case of two agents by Pareto-efficiency
within spot markets the donor’s utility increases. In this statement the utility
comparison is done across the competitive equilibria of the economy before and
after the donation. In the standard case of the transfer paradox, the transfer
was considered to be a transfer of a non-negative amount of commodities
([27]). In order to make the equivalence to the sunspot model more obvious
we consider a slightly more general definition of the transfer paradox which
only requires that the donated commodities have non-negative value in the
competitive equilibrium after the transfer. As [14] have already shown this
generalization is innocuous.
In the following definition we consider alternative possible transfers ∆ω(z)
that we index by some scenarios z. When relating the transfer paradox to
sunspot equilibria these scenarios will be associated with different states of
the world, s = 1, . . . , S. Taking care of potentially multiple equilibria the
transfer paradox is then defined as in4
Definition 2 (Transfer Paradox). Given an economy with fundamentals
[(ui, ωi)i=1,...,I ] the transfer paradox occurs if and only if there exists some
transfer of endowments ∆ω(z) ∈ IRLI , with ∑Ii=1∆ωi(z) = 0 such that for
the economy [(ui, ωi +∆ωi(z))i=1,...,I ] there exists an equilibrium (
?
x(z),
?
p(z))
with
?
p(z) ·∆ω1(z) ≥ 0 so that u1(?x1(z)) < u1(?x1(0)) for some equilibrium
(
?
x(0),
?
p(0)) of the economic fundamentals, [(ui, ωi)i=1,...,I ], in the reference
scenario without transfers, s = 0.
Note that under certain conditions and if the economic fundamentals have at
least two equilibria then even without any transfers the transfer paradox oc-
curs. Our definition covers this case because then ∆ω = 0 is already sufficient
to obtain u1(
?
x1(z)) < u1(
?
x1(0)) for the two equilibria s = 0, z. Of course if
4To save on notation we define the transfer paradox with respect to the value of
the transfers and changes in utility of agent 1.
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the resulting equilibria are regular then in this case one can also find some
transfers of endowments that have positive value and yet the recipients utility
decreases. Making the transfer paradox a bit more paradoxical.
We will show that the occurrence of the transfer paradox is a necessary
condition for sunspots to matter. To show a converse of this claim we consider
the following slightly stronger notion of the transfer paradox.
Definition 3 (Strong Transfer Paradox). Given an economy with funda-
mentals [(ui, ωi)i=1,...,I ] the strong transfer paradox occurs if and only if there
exist some transfers of endowments, ∆ω(z) ∈ IRLI , with ∑Ii=1∆ωi(z) = 0
and ∆ω(s˜) ∈ IRLI , with ∑Ii=1∆ωi(s˜) = 0 such that for the economies
[(ui, ωi +∆ωi(s))i=1,...,I ], s = z, s˜
1. there are some equilibria (
?
x(z),
?
p(z)), (
?
x(s˜),
?
p(s˜)) with
?
p(z) ·∆ω1(z) ≥ 0
and
?
p(s˜) ·∆ω1(s˜) ≤ 0 and
2. it holds that u1(
?
x1(z)) < u1(
?
x1(s˜)) < u1(
?
x1(0)) for some equilibrium
(
?
x(0),
?
p(0)) of the economic fundamentals [(ui, ωi)i=1,...,I ], in the refer-
ence scenario without transfers s = 0.
Note, that if the economic fundamentals have at least three equilibria then by
the same reason as given for the transfer paradox the strong transfer paradox
occurs. Hence the existence of at least (three) two equilibria is sufficient for
the (strong) transfer paradox. Of course, in regular economies we know that
if there are at least two equilibria then there also are at least three equilib-
ria (cf. [9]). This observation indicates that in regular economies the transfer
paradox and the strong transfer paradox are actually equivalent. Indeed this
it true as the next proposition shows. Recall that in regular economies equi-
libria are well determined, i.e. in a neighborhood of regular equilibria (being
defined by full rank of the Jacobian of market excess demand) there exists
a smooth mapping from the exogenous parameters of the economy to the
endogenous equilibrium values (cf. [8]). In the following argument regular-
ity needs only be required for the spot market equilibria of the economic
fundamentals. This property holds generically in the set of agents’ initial en-
dowments IRLI++ (cf. [8]).
Proposition 1. Suppose all spot market equilibria of the economic funda-
mentals [(ui, ωi)i=1,...,I ] are regular. Then the transfer paradox and the strong
transfer paradox are equivalent.
Proof
The strong transfer paradox implies the transfer paradox. To establish the
converse suppose that the transfer paradox holds. I.e. there exists some trans-
fer of endowments ∆ω(z) ∈ IRLI , with ∑Ii=1∆ωi(z) = 0, such that for the
economy [(ui, ωi + ∆ωi(z))i=1,...,i] there exists an equilibrium (
?
x(z),
?
p(z))
with
?
p(z) ·∆ω1(z) ≥ 0 so that u1(?x1(z)) < u1(?x1(0)) for some equilibrium
(
?
xi(0),
?
p(0)) of the economic fundamentals, s = 0.
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We need to show that there also exists some ∆ω(s˜) ∈ IRLI , with∑I
i=1∆ω
i(s˜) = 0 such that
?
p(s˜) ·∆ω1(s˜) ≤ 0 and u1(?x1(z)) < u1(?x1(s˜)) <
u1(
?
x1(0)).
This is of course the intuitive case in which a negatively valued transfer
leads to a loss in utility. However, we need to ensure that this is the outcome in
the spot market equilibrium after the transfer and that the utility loss is not
too severe as compared to the loss in the transfer paradox case. This is ensured
by the regularity of the equilibrium of the economic fundamentals from which
we construct the transfer appropriately: Consider the utility gradient of agent
1, ∇u1(?x1(0)) at the equilibrium of the economic fundamentals. Choose the
transfers (∆ω1(s˜)), such that ∇u1(?x1(0))(∆ω1(s˜)) < 0. By the first order
condition of utility maximization in the reference situation s = 0 we get
that this wealth transfer evaluated at the pre-transfer prices is negative,
?
p(0)·
(∆ω(s˜)) < 0. Since ∇u1(?x1(0))(∆ω(s˜)) < 0, by proposition 31.2 (ii) in [28]
we can find some 1 ≥ α > 0 such that u1(?x1(0) + α(∆ω(s˜))) < u1(?x1(0)).
Moreover, by the regularity of the economy, α > 0 can be chosen small enough
so that also the utility at the induced equilibrium is smaller than in the
reference situation without transfers, u1(
?
x1(s˜)) < u1(
?
x1(0)). This is because in
regular economies the induced change in the equilibrium allocation
?
x1(s˜) can
be held small so that |u1(?x1(s˜))−u1(?x1(0)+α∆ω(s˜))| is also small. Moreover,
by the same continuity argument this can be done such that ∆ω1(s˜) evaluated
at prices after the transfer is non-positive, i.e.
?
p(s˜) ·∆ω1(s˜) ≤ 0. Finally, all
this can be done without decreasing the utility level too much, so that for
agent 1 we get the inequality u1(
?
x1(z)) < u1(
?
x1(s˜)) < u1(
?
x1(0)).
¤
The strong transfer paradox ensures the order crossing property mentioned
in the introduction. To see this note that it is always possible to find transfers
of resources, say ∆ω(sˆ), such that the transfer to agent 1 has negative value in
the resulting equilibrium, i.e.
?
p(sˆ)·∆ω1(sˆ) ≤ 0, and agent 1 gets a level of utility
that is smaller than any of the utility levels considered in the definition of the
strong transfer paradox, i.e. u1(
?
x1(sˆ)) < u1(
?
x1(z)) < u1(
?
x1(s˜)) < u1(
?
x1(0)).5
By this observation we get three transfers, two with negative value and one
with positive value so that the utility decreases for all transfers. As we will see,
by assumption 1, in the case of two agents, we then get that the order of the
marginal utilities does not coincide with the order or the reverse order of the
5Note that these losses in utility as compared to the equilibrium of the economic
fundamentals do not conflict with the fact that trade is voluntary because it may
well be that the utility of agent 1 derived from his initial endowments is even smaller
than the expected utility obtained in the spot market equilibria. Also the agent is
assumed to be a price taker, i.e. he cannot enforce the equilibrium of the economic
fundamentals.
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transfer values, i.e. the order crossing property is also obtained for marginal
utilities.
Note that the transfer paradox concerns the ordering of income trans-
fers and utility levels. In the first order condition for asset demand however
marginal utilities and not utility levels themselves play a role. Hence we need
to know how the levels of marginal utility are related to the utility levels.
Keeping prices fixed across different states, by concavity of the utility func-
tion, marginal utilities are inversely related to utility levels. This feature oc-
curs for example if the agents have identical and homothetic preferences. In
this case however neither sunspot equilibria matter nor the transfer paradox
occurs. In general, changes in relative prices induced by redistributions of in-
come are decisive to determine both the level of utility and of marginal utility.
It is these changes from which the transfer paradox and also the existence of
sunspot equilibria are derived. Nevertheless, with two agents, whose utilities
are concave transformations of additively separable functions, we show that
marginal utilities are negatively associated to the level of utilities. To make
these ideas precise, we first define the agents’ indirect utility function and
their marginal utility of income within each state without considering the
monotonic transformations hi:
Let
vi(s) = vi(p(s), bi(s)) = max
xi∈Xi
f i
(
L∑
l=1
gil(x
i
l(s))
)
s.t. p(s)·xi(s) ≤ bi(s)
be the indirect utility of agents i in state s. Since the functions gil , l = 1, . . . , L
are concave and since at least L − 1 of them are strictly concave there is a
unique point xi at which the utility attains its maximum, given that for all
commodities the prices pl(s), l = 1, . . . , L and the income bi(s) are positive.
In our model the income bi(s) will be given by p(s) · (ωi +A(s) · θi). I.e., the
values of the transfers are given by ri(s) = p(s) ·A(s) · θi. In the analysis of
the sunspot model the agents’ marginal utility of income will be important
λi(s) = ∂vhi(vi(s)) ∂bvi(p(s), bi(s)) .
Hence the marginal utilities that determine the asset allocation are given by
the marginal utilities within each state, ∂bvi(p(s), bi(s)), multiplied by the first
derivative of the agents’ concave transformations hi determining the agents’
risk aversion.
The association between levels of utilities and of marginal utilities is an
important link between the transfer paradox and sunspot equilibria which we
therefore need to define properly:
Definition 4 (Inverse Association of Utilities and Marginal Utili-
ties). We say that for some agent i the levels of marginal utility are inversely
associated to the levels of utility if
vi(1) ≥ vi(2) ≥ . . . ≥ vi(S)
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implies
λi(1) ≤ λi(2) ≤ . . . ≤ λi(S) .
Moreover, if vi(s˜) < vi(z) for some s˜, z ∈ {1, . . . , S} then the corresponding
inequality in the marginal utilities of income should also be strict.
This definition puts us in the position to state the equivalence of the
occurrence of the transfer paradox and the existence of sunspot equilibria.
Theorem 1 (Equivalence Sunspot Equilibria and Transfer Paradox).
Suppose assumption 2 holds and all agents’ level of marginal utility are in-
versely associated to their level of utility. Then
1. the transfer paradox is a necessary condition for sunspots to matter and
2. if there are only two agents then the strong transfer paradox is a sufficient
condition for sunspots to matter.
Proof
1. To link the transfer paradox to the sunspot economy consider
ri(s) :=
?
p(s)·A(s)
?
θi,
i.e. the transfer of income to agent i as generated by asset trade in some
competitive equilibrium.
A necessary condition for optimal portfolio choice is
S∑
s=1
λi(s)pi(s) ri(s) = 0 , i = 1, . . . , I ,
which we call the first-order conditions for asset demand.6
Now suppose that the transfer paradox does not hold. Then negative
transfers ri(s) < 0 are associated with lower utility levels than positive
transfers ri(s) > 0 are. If moreover marginal utilities are inversely associ-
ated to utilities then negative transfers are associated with higher marginal
utility levels than positive transfers are. Hence the first order condition for
asset demand requires that the probability weighted sum of the absolute
values of negative transfers is smaller than the probability weigthed sum
of positive transfers:∑
s:ri(s)>0
pi(s) ri(s) > −
∑
s:ri(s)<0
pi(s) ri(s) , for all i = 1, .., I . (1)
This however conflicts with asset market clearing, which implies that in-
come transfers must be balanced:
6This condition follows from
∑
s λ
i(s)pi(s) p(s)A(s) = γiq together with q · θi =
0.
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I∑
i=1
ri(s) = 0 , for all s = 1, . . . , S . (2)
To see this, multiply equation (2) by pi(s) and sum those equations over
states to obtain:
S∑
s=1
I∑
i=1
pi(s) ri(s) = 0. (3)
Rearranging terms this implies
I∑
i=1
 ∑
s:ri(s)>0
pi(s) ri(s)−
∑
s:ri(s)<0
pi(s) ri(s)
 = 0 , (4)
which contradicts equation (1).
2. Suppose the strong transfer paradox occurs, then there exist transfers
indexed by s˜, z such that
r1(z) ≥ 0 , r1(s˜) ≤ 0 and for some equilibria v1(z) < v1(s˜) < v1(0)
where v1(0) refers to agent 1’s utility in an equilibrium of the spot economy
s = 0. Given the utility functions u1, u2 and given the total endowments
ω1 + ω2 consider the set of Pareto-efficient allocations as being parame-
terized by the income transfers r.
Now we have to distinguish three cases:
Case 1: If r1(z) > 0
then we know that b1(z) > 0 and therefore there exists r1(sˆ) < 0 suffi-
ciently small such that for the induced b1(sˆ) = (b1(z) + r1(sˆ)) ≥ 0 we
get v1(sˆ) < v1(z) for some equilibrium in sˆ. By thisobservation and the
strong transfer paradox we have the order crossing property:
r1(sˆ) ≤ 0 , r1(s˜) ≤ 0 , r1(z) > 0
while
v1(sˆ) < v1(z) < v1(s˜)
so that by the negative association of marginal utilities to the level of
utilities
λ1(sˆ) > λ1(z) > λ1(s˜) .
To construct the sunspot equilibrium consider an economy with the three
states s = sˆ, s˜, z. In this case the first-order conditions for asset demand
become:
λi(sˆ)pi(sˆ) |ri(sˆ)|+ λi(s˜)pi(s˜) |ri(s˜)| = λi(z)pi(z) |ri(z)| , i = 1, 2 .
Now choose pi(z) < 1 sufficiently large (and accordingly pi(sˆ) > 0 and
pi(s˜) > 0 sufficiently small) such that
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pi(sˆ) |ri(sˆ)|+ pi(s˜) |ri(s˜)| < pi(z) |ri(z)| .
Note that ∂hi is any continuous, positive and decreasing function. Recall
that, λ1(s˜) < λ1(z) and that v1(sˆ) is the smallest utility level in the
three states. Hence we can choose h1 such that λ1(sˆ) is sufficiently large
to solve the first order condition for i = 1. Analogously it follows that
λ2(sˆ) < λ2(z) and we can choose h2 such that λ2(s˜) is sufficiently large
to solve the first order condition for i = 2.
To complete the proof we follow the analogous steps as in [29]. Choose
A ∈ IR3L×2 such that
r1(s) = p(s)·(A1(s)−A2(s)) for s = s˜, sˆ, z . (5)
Finally, note that∑
s
λ1(s)pi(s) p(s)·A1(s) =
∑
s
λ1(s)pi(s) p(s)·A2(s)
so that we can choose q1 = q2. Accordingly we choose θ1 = (1,−1),
θ2 = (−1, 1) so that q ·θi = 0, i = 1, 2 and θ1 + θ2 = 0. Since we have
chosen an economy with two assets, the first-order conditions for asset
trade are equivalent to the conditions
∑
s λ
i(s)pi(s) p(s)A(s) = γiq.
Case 2: If r1(z) = 0 and r1(s˜) = 0
then by the strong transfer paradox, even without trading any asset, there
is a competitive equilibrium in which sunspots matter.
Case 3: Finally, the case r1(z) = 0 and r1(s˜) < 0
is already covered by the reasoning of the first case if one changes the
point of view from agent 1 to agent 2.
¤
Remark 2. Note that in the theorem above part 1 has been shown for the
most general statement without evoking any particular assumption on the
asset structure A ∈ IRSL×J . part 2 however is a stronger claim the more the
set of asset structures can be restricted. The choice of the asset structure
matters in equation (5) of the proof. One way of restricting A is to only
consider numeraire assets so that all assets pay off in the same commodity.
Allowing for sunspot dependent assets this is a possible choice in the solution
of equation (5). If assets are not allowed to depend on the sunspot states then
one can still find an asset structure solving equation (5), provided the three
price vectors p(s), s = s˜, sˆ, z are linearly independent. The latter then requires
to have at least 3 commodities.
To complete this section we first show that under assumption 3 in the case
of two agents the order of the marginal utilities of income is inverse to the
order of their (indirect) utilities. Hence not only in the trivial case of identical
and homothetic preferences we get this property but we also get it for all
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numerical examples with two agents that have so far been considered in the
sunspot and in the transfer paradox literature.
Lemma 1. Suppose there are only two agents. Without loss of generality as-
sume that in a competitive equilibrium
v1(1) ≤ v1(2) ≤ . . . ≤ v1(S).
Then under assumption 3 it follows that
λ1(1) ≥ λ1(2) ≥ . . . ≥ λ1(S)
and that
λ2(1) ≤ λ2(2) ≤ . . . ≤ λ2(S) .
Moreover, if v1(s˜) < v1(z) for some s˜, z ∈ {1, . . . , S} then the corresponding
inequality in the marginal utilities of income is also strict.
Proof
Assume that
v1(s˜) ≤ v1(z) ( resp. that v1(s˜) < v1(z) ) for some s˜, z ∈ {1, . . . , S} .
Then, by monotonicity of the utility function, for some commodity, say k ∈
{l, . . . , L} we must have that
x1k(s˜) ≤ x1k(z) ( resp. that x1k(s˜) < x1k(z) ) .
Moreover, Pareto-efficiency within spot markets implies that for all states
s = 1, . . . , S the marginal rates of substitution are equal across agents, i.e.
∂g1m(x
1
m(s))
∂g1l (x
1
l (s))
=
∂g2m(x
2
m(s))
∂g2l (x
2
l (s))
for any pair of commodities (l,m). Note that x2m(s) = ω1m + ω2m − x1m(s),
s = 1, . . . , S. Hence if the functions gil are concave and if for some agent the
function gil is strictly concave then it follows that
x1l (s˜) ≤ x1l (z) ( resp. that x1l (s˜) < x1l (z) ) for all l = 1, . . . , L .
Without loss of generality assume that l = n is the numeraire in all states
s = 1, . . . , S, where n is chosen such that g1n is strictly concave. Hence we have
shown that
v1(1) ≤ v1(2) ≤ . . . ≤ v1(S) (with v1(s˜) < v1(z) for some s˜, z )
implies for the numeraire that
x1n(1) ≤ x1n(2) ≤ . . . ≤ x1n(S) ( with x1n(s˜) < x1n(z) for some s˜, z ) .
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From the first order condition to the maximization problem
max
xi∈Xi
∑
l
g1l (x
1
l (s)) s.t. p(s)·x1(s) ≤ b1(s)
we get that λ1(p(s), b1(s)) = ∂y(h1◦f1)(y) ∂g1n(x1n(s)) for all s = 1, . . . , S. Since
h1◦f1, g1n are (strictly) concave and since x1n(s) and y1(s) =
∑
l g
1
l (x
1
l (s)) are
increasing (resp. strictly increasing) in s we get that
λ1(1) ≥ λ1(2) ≥ . . . ≥ λ1(S) ( resp. that λ1(z) > λ1(s˜) ) .
The claim for i = 2 follows analogously from the inverse inequalities
x2l (1) ≥ x2l (2) ≥ . . . ≥ x2l (S) for l = 1, . . . , L ,
and from
v2(1) ≥ v2(2) ≥ . . . ≥ v2(S) ,
the latter inequalities being implied by Pareto-efficiency within spot markets.
¤
Before passing to the next section we want to point out that the assump-
tion of additive separability is indeed tight. The inverse association between
the levels of marginal utilities and that of utilities, as shown in lemma 1 does
not necessarily hold without additive separability. As the following example
shows without additive separability one can find that lower utilities are as-
sociated with lower marginal utilities. The endowments in this example are
supposed to be the ex-post endowments. Hence they are allowed to depend
on the sunspot states since the asset payoffs may depend on them.
Remark 3. Consider a two-agent economy with two commodities. The utility
functions are7:
u1(x1) =
√
x11x
1
2 + x
1
2 and u
2(x2) =
√
x21x
2
2 + x
2
1 .
Note that neither of the two utility functions is additively separable but both
are strictly monotonically increasing and strictly concave on IR2++ and both
satisfy the Inada-conditions. Moreover, note that both utility functions are
homogenous of degree one implying that both goods are normal. In situation
s = 1 the ex-post endowments are
ωˆ11(1) = 1 , ωˆ
1
2(1) = 5 and ωˆ
2
1(1) = 4 , ωˆ
2
2(1) = 2 .
There is a unique equilibrium8 with prices p(1) = (1, 0.7125). The equilibrium
budgets are:
7The transformations hi◦f i are assumed to be the identity, which is a strictly
increasing concave function.
8All values have been rounded to 4 decimal digits. The exact values can be
found at the page http://www.iew.unizh.ch/home/hens/sunspot. Uniqueness can
be seen from the graph of the excess demand also shown on the webpage.
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b1(1) = 4.5623 and b2(1) = 5.4249 .
The resulting allocation is:
x11(1) = 0.5380 , x
1
2(1) = 5.6485 and x
2
1(1) = 4.4620 , x
2
2(1) = 1.3515 .
The utility levels are:
u1(1) = 7.3917 and u2(1) = 6.9177 .
Marginal utilities within state 1,
(
∂bv
i(1) = v
i(1)
bi(1)
)
i=1,2
, are:
∂bv
1(1) = 1.6202 and ∂bv2(1) = 1.2752 .
Now consider a second situation s = 2 with the same total endowments but
with a distribution of ex-post endowments as:
ωˆ11(2) = 5 , ωˆ
1
2(2) = 5 and ωˆ
2
1(2) = 0 , ωˆ
2
2(2) = 2 .
Again, there is a unique equilibrium, now with prices p(2) = (1 , 1.5113). The
equilibrium budgets are:
b1(2) = 12.5563 and b2(2) = 3.0225 .
The resulting allocation is:
x11(2) = 2.3164 , x
1
2(2) = 6.7758 and x
2
1(2) = 2.6836 , x
2
2(2) = 0.2242 .
The utility levels are:
u1(2) = 10.7375 and u2(2) = 3.4594 .
Marginal utilities within state 2 are:
∂bv
1(2) = 0.8552 and ∂bv2(2) = 1.1445 .
Note that the second agent’s utility and his marginal utility has decreased is
passing from situation 1 to situation 2. Finally, note that we could also have
chosen two strictly concave functions hi such that the same ordering still holds
for the marginal utilities λi(s) = ∂vhi(vi) ∂bvi(s).
The next example shows that for more than two agents the strong transfer
paradox is no longer sufficient for the existence of sunspot equilibria. The
simple reason is that for agent 1 the strong transfer paradox may occur while
the two other agents will not find income transfers of opposite sign.
Remark 4. The example to construct the strong transfer paradox is the famous
three country example from [6].
There are three agents and two goods. The utility functions are:
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u1(x11, x
1
2) = min(x
1
1, 4.0x
1
2) ,
u2(x21, x
2
2) = min(x
2
1, x
2
2) ,
u3(x31, x
3
2) = min(2.8x
3
1, x
3
2) .
Note that this example uses Leontief preferences. Hence strictly spoken our
assumption 1 is not satisfied. However, these preferences can be attained as a
limit case of CES-utility functions. That is to say, perturbing the preferences
slightly within the CES-class will establish an example satisfying assump-
tion 1 and if we like to transform it by a sufficiently concave function hi
also assumption 3 can be satisfied, as we mentioned above. Moreover, note
that both utility functions, ui are homogenous of degree one implying that
both goods are normal. Consider the situations s=0, s˜, z, sˆ as required by the
strong transfer paradox.
Let the matrix of endowments (for both goods per agent and state), with
rows corresponding to states s=0, sˆ, z, s˜ and with columns corresponding to
agents, be:
ω =

(1 , 1.00) (2 , 1.00) (1 , 3.00)
(1 , 0.10) (2 , 2.40) (1 , 2.50)
(1 , 1.10) (2 , 1.00) (1 , 2.90)
(1 , 0.80) (2 , 1.25) (1 , 2.95)
 ,
In all situations there is a unique equilibrium9. The equilibrium price vectors
are:
p(0) = (5.9084 , 1) ,
p(s˜) = (4.4892 , 1) ,
p(z) = (9.6382 , 1) ,
p(sˆ) = (0.9438 , 1) .
Evaluated at these equilibrium prices the transfers as compared to situation
s = 0 are:
r1(s˜) = −0.2 , r2(s˜) = 0.25 and r3(s˜) = −0.5 ,
r1(z) = 0.1 , r2(z) = 0.00 and r3(z) = −0.1 ,
r1(sˆ) = −0.9 , r2(sˆ) = 1.40 and r3(sˆ) = −0.5 .
The equilibrium budgets are:
b1(0) = 6.9084 , b2(0) = 12.8169 and b3(0) = 8.9084 ,
b1(s˜) = 5.2892 , b2(s˜) = 10.2284 and b3(s˜) = 7.4392 ,
b1(z) = 10.7382 , b2(z) = 20.2765 and b3(z) = 12.5382 ,
b1(sˆ) = 1.0438 , b2(sˆ) = 4.2876 and b3(sˆ) = 3.4438 .
9All values have been rounded to 4 decimal digits. The exact values can be
found at the page http://www.iew.unizh.ch/home/hens/sunspot. Uniqueness can
be seen from the graph of the excess demand function which is displayed at the
webpage together with the computations.
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The resulting allocations are:
x =

(1.1218 , 0.2804) (1.8552 , 1.8552) (1.0230 , 2.8643)
(1.1161 , 0.2790) (1.8634 , 1.8634) (1.0206 , 2.8576)
(1.0860 , 0.2715) (1.9060 , 1.9060) (1.0080 , 2.8225)
(0.8744 , 0.2186) (2.2058 , 2.2058) (0.9120 , 2.5756)
 ,
The corresponding utility levels are:
u1(0) = 1.1218 , u2(0) = 1.8552 and u3(0) = 2.8643 ,
u1(s˜) = 1.1161 , u2(s˜) = 1.8634 and u3(s˜) = 2.8576 ,
u1(z) = 1.0860 , u2(z) = 1.9060 and u3(z) = 2.8225 ,
u1(sˆ) = 0.8744 , u2(sˆ) = 2.2058 and u3(sˆ) = 2.5756 .
Marginal utilities
(
∂bv
i(s) = v
i(s)
bi(s)
)
i=1,2,3.
are:
∂bv
1(0) = 0.1624 , ∂bv2(0) = 0.1448 and ∂bv3(0) = 0.3215 ,
∂bv
1(s˜) = 0.2110 , ∂bv2(s˜) = 0.1822 and ∂bv3(s˜) = 0.3841 ,
∂bv
1(z) = 0.1011 , ∂bv2(z) = 0.0940 and ∂bv3(z) = 0.2251 ,
∂bv
1(sˆ) = 0.8377 , ∂bv2(sˆ) = 0.5145 and ∂bv3(sˆ) = 0.7479 .
Note that the second agent’s transfers are never negative while that of the
third agent are never positive. Hence these transfers cannot be sustained by
asset trade. Finally, note that as compared to situation s = 0 the third agent’s
utility and his marginal utility has decreased in passing to situation s = z.
4 Sunspot Equilibria and Uniqueness of Spot Market
Equilibria
Having established the link between the transfer paradox and the existence of
sunspot equilibria we now derive some new results on the existence of sunspot
equilibria when spot market equilibria are unique on the one hand and also
on the possibility of the transfer paradox on the other hand. Applying part 1
of our theorem and [36] we can rule out sunspot equilibria if marginal util-
ities are inversely related to utilities and spot market equilibria are unique
at all non-negative distributions of endowments. Once again, applying part 1
of our theorem and [2] we can rule out sunspot equilibria in the case of two
commodities and two agents if the economic fundamentals do have a unique
equilibrium. On the other hand, applying the construction of [29], which is
done for the case of two agents, part 2 of our result shows that the trans-
fer paradox can occur even if for the economic fundamentals there exists a
representative consumer. We continue, using once more part 2, to show that
sunspot equilibria need not be derived from multiple equilibria of the spot
market economy that is obtained by asset trade leading to the same endow-
ment distribution in all states. While [29]’s construction uses that there are
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multiple equilibria for the induced distribution of endowments, this example
however exploits the fact that there are multiple equilibria for the initial dis-
tribution of endowments. Therefore, we give one more example in which spot
market equilibria are unique for all distributions of endowments that can be
arrived at by asset trade and still sunspots matter. This final example then
settles the question whether sunspot equilibria need to be based on some sort
of multiplicity of spot market equilibria.
The following terminology is quite useful. A randomization equilibrium is
a competitive equilibrium in which for some ex-post endowments the equi-
librium allocation in every state s is a spot market allocation for the same
economy. If, for example, the economic fundamentals allow for multiple equi-
libria then there is a randomization equilibrium. [29] has shown that there can
also be randomization equilibria if there are multiple equilibria for some dis-
tribution of endowments that is attainable via asset trade. In both cases the
equilibrium allocation of such a competitive equilibrium is a randomization
among the set of equilibria of some underlying economy. In randomization
equilibria sunspots are a device to coordinate agents’ expectations. This case
of sunspot equilibria has found many applications. In the international trade
literature, for example, currency crises are modelled by randomization sunspot
equilibria. See, for example, the seminal papers by [31] and [32] and also the
interesting empirical papers on this issue by [22] and [23]).
The question that arises from these observations is whether sunspot equi-
libria could be identified with randomization equilibria. This would then make
them very similar to publicly correlated equilibria known in the game theoretic
literature ([1])10. Hence, the results of this literature would then be applicable
to sunspot equilibria.
It is obvious that in our setting with intrinsically complete markets
sunspot equilibria necessarily are randomization equilibria if assets are sun-
independent assets, if A(s) = A(1), s = 1, . . . , S. It is, however, not obvious at
all whether with a general asset structure there can also be sunspot equilibria
which are different from randomization equilibria. To clarify this point some
more definitions are needed.
Definition 5 (Attainable Endowment Distributions). Given the econo-
mic fundamentals [(ui, ωi)i=1,...,I ] and given the asset structure A the endow-
ment distributions ωˆi(s), s = 1, . . . , S, i = 1, . . . , I is attainable if there exists
some competitive equilibrium with asset allocation (
?
θi), i = 1, . . . , I, such that
ωˆi(s) = ωi +A(s)
?
θi, s = 1, . . . , S, i = 1, . . . , I.
Based on the attainability concept we now define the uniqueness concept
suggested in [29]. This condition has later been called no potential multiplicity
by [16].
10See [12] for relating sunspot equilibria to correlated equilibria in an overlapping
generations model.
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Definition 6 (Strong Uniqueness). The economy with the fundamentals
[(ui, ωi)i=1,...,I ] satisfies the strong uniqueness property for some asset struc-
ture A, if the spot market equilibria are unique for every attainable endowment
distribution.
Remark 5. With intrinsically incomplete markets sunspots are known to mat-
ter even if the economic fundamentals satisfy the strong uniqueness property
(cf. [4] and the literature that has emerged from it, [17] and [16]).
As said above, when assets are sun-independent then in our setting with in-
trinsically complete markets the strong uniqueness property rules out sunspot
equilibria. The following corollary to our theorem shows that for general asset
structures the strong uniqueness property restricted to non-negative alloca-
tions is still sufficient to rule out sunspot equilibria when marginal utilities
are inversely related to levels of utility.
Corollary 1. Under assumptions 1 and 2 and if marginal utilities are in-
versely related to levels of utility then sunspots do not matter if there are
unique spot market equilibria for all non-negative distributions of endowments
in the Edgeworth box.
Proof
Suppose sunspots did matter, then from our main result we know that the
transfer paradox needs to occur. However, as [36] has shown, this requires to
be able to trade to some non-negative distribution of endowments for which
there are multiple equilibria, which is a violation of the strong uniqueness
property.
¤
Hence applying our lemma 1, in particular in the case of two agents,
sunspots do not matter if there are unique spot market equilibria for all dis-
tributions of endowments in the Edgeworth box.
However, asking for the strong uniqueness property may be asking too
much since not many economic fundamentals will satisfy this property. Hence
the question arises whether sunspot equilibria can exist when there are multi-
ple equilibria for some distribution of endowments the economy can arrive at
using asset trade. As [29] has shown this is definitely the case. However, [29]
did not show that this is still the case if for the initial distribution of endow-
ments there is a unique equilibrium. Note if there were also multiple equilibria
at that point then sunspots would matter even without evoking asset trade.
The question then is whether ”trading from uniqueness to multiplicity” is
possible. As the following corollary shows, this is not possible if there are two
agents and two commodities.
Corollary 2. Under assumption 3, in the case of two commodities and two
consumers sunspots do not matter if the economic fundamentals have a unique
equilibrium.
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Proof
Suppose sunspots did matter then from our main result we know that the
transfer paradox needs to occur. However, as for example [2]11 has shown, in
the case of two commodities this requires to have multiple equilibria for the
initial distributions of endowments.
¤
From corollary 2 we can see that in the case of two commodities and
sun-independent assets it is not possible to ”trade from uniqueness to multi-
plicity”. This is because with sun-independent assets sunspots can only matter
at distributions of endowments for which there are multiple equilibria.
[19] has claimed that for an economy with two agents and two commodi-
ties in which utility functions are concave transformations of Cobb-Douglas
utility functions sunspots matter. The corollary 2 shows that this claim is in-
correct. Moreover the mistake in [19] cannot be cured by changing the values
of the parameters for the same example12 because that example falls into the
broad class of economies which are covered by this note. Indeed for Cobb-
Douglas economies the equilibrium at the initial distribution of endowments
is unique and the strong uniqueness requirement is satisfied for almost all
asset structures A.
Making further assumptions on the agents’ risk aversion functions hi, [33]
shows that the construction of [29] does not work if there are only two com-
modities. Indeed, [33] shows for an economy with an arbitrary number of
consumers with additive separable utilities ui and non-decreasing relative risk
aversion, with two commodities and with asset payoffs that are independent
of the sunspot states, non-trivial sunspot equilibria do not exist.
The next example shows that with more than two commodities [29]’s con-
struction can be followed to demonstrate that it is well possible to trade from
uniqueness to multiplicity. Hence sunspot equilibria do occur even if for the
initial distribution of endowments there is a unique equilibrium. By our the-
orem then also the transfer paradox needs to occur because the economy we
construct has two consumers with CES-utility functions. That the transfer
paradox arises even if the initial equilibrium is unique should be no surprise
since this is well known in that literature. In the example we give we do how-
ever have some more structure. For the initial distribution of endowments the
excess demand function of the economic fundamentals can be generated by a
single representative consumer. Hence our example shows that ”the represen-
tative consumer is not immune against sunspots” and that even under this
strong structural assumption the transfer paradox is possible.
11See also the solution to exercise 15.B.10C from [30] that is given in [18].
12This possibility is left open by the observation of [3] who demonstrate that for
the specific parameter values chosen in [19] sunspots do not matter!
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Corollary 3. There exist economic fundamentals, satisfying assumptions 1
and 2, with two agents for which there is a representative consumer and yet
sunspot equilibria and the transfer paradox occur.
Proof
The example we give to prove this claim follows the construction of [29] making
sure that it can be done even under assumption 1 and 2 and more importantly,
that it can be done even for economic fundamentals with a representative
consumer:
There are four commodities and two CES-consumers with utility functions:
ui(xi) =
4∑
l=1
(
(αil)
1−ρi(xil)
ρi
)1/ρi
The utility parameters are13: ρ1 = −250.00000, ρ2 = −250.00000 and
α1 = (0.24986 , 0.24986 , 0.25041 , 0.24986) ,
α2 = (0.25261 , 0.25224 , 0.24758 , 0.24758) .
Note that utility functions satisfy assumption 1 and that they are linearly
homogenous. Moreover, agents utilities are close to the Leontief case which
is convenient because then the Slutzky-subsitution effects contributing to the
uniqueness of equilibria are small. Initial endowments are:
ω1 = (0.01024 , 0.01021 , 0.01006 , 0.0101) ,
ω2 = (0.01011 , 0.01009 , 0.00994 , 0.01) .
Note that the second agent’s initial endowments multiplied with 1.00971 gives
the first agent’s endowments, i.e. endowments are collinear and hence, by [11]’s
theorem, for this economy there exists a representative consumer.
Suppose there are three sunspot states, s = 1, 2, 3. We claim that trade in
(sun-independent) assets can be used to arrive at the following distribution
of endowments for which there are three spot market equilibria:
ωˆ1 = (0.01414 , −0.01804 , 0.01259 , 0.0197) ,
ωˆ2 = (0.00621 , 0.03834 , 0.00741 , 0.00037) .
The resulting spot market equilibrium prices are:
p(1) = (1 , 1.5801 , 5.05786 , 0.88298) ,
p(2) = (1 , 1.37985 , 0.88617 , 0.35661) ,
p(3) = (1 , 1.6344 , 11.79925 , 3.67601) .
Note that the rank of the price matrix is three since the determinant of all
prices excluding the numeraire is −11.11 . The equilibrium budgets are:
13All values have been rounded to 5 decimal digits. The exact values can be found
at the page http://www.iew.unizh.ch/home/hens/sunspot.
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b1(1) = 0.06669 and b2(1) = 0.10461 ,
b1(2) = 0.00742 and b2(2) = 0.06582 ,
b1(3) = 0.20558 and b2(3) = 0.15770 .
The resulting allocations are:
x1(1) = (0.00785 , 0.00783 , 0.00781 , 0.00785) ,
x2(1) = (0.01250 , 0.01246 , 0.01218 , 0.01226) ,
x1(2) = (0.00205 , 0.00204 , 0.00205 , 0.00206) ,
x2(2) = (0.01830 , 0.01825 , 0.01795 , 0.01801) ,
x1(3) = (0.01142 , 0.01140 , 0.01134 , 0.01136) ,
x2(3) = (0.00893 , 0.00890 , 0.00866 , 0.00871) .
As was to be expected in a case close to the Leontief-preferences, for both
agents and in all states the demand of any good l as a fraction of the sum of
all demands stay close to the agents utility parameters αil even though prices
vary substantially.
The corresponding utility levels are:
u1(1) = 0.03132 and u2(1) = 0.04935 ,
u1(2) = 0.00819 and u2(2) = 0.07249 ,
u1(3) = 0.04544 and u2(3) = 0.03513 .
Marginal utilities
(
∂bv
i(s) = u
i(s)
bi(s)
)
i=1,2,3.
are:
∂bv
1(1) = 0.46960 and ∂bv2(1) = 0.47178 ,
∂bv
1(2) = 1.10458 and ∂bv2(2) = 1.10130 ,
∂bv
1(3) = 0.22104 and ∂bv2(3) = 0.22277 .
Note that agent 1’s marginal utilities are ordered inversely to his utilities while
agent 2’s marginal utilities are ordered as his utility levels. This is possible
here because, as mentioned above, the assumption 3 is not satisfied for CES-
utilities. Evaluating the change in endowments at the new equilibrium prices,
the resulting income transfers from agent 1’s point of view are:
r1(1) = 0.00201 , r1(2) = 0.02195 , r1(3) = −0.05989 .
Next we argue that for these values we can solve the first order condition for
asset demand: ∑
s
h′i(vi(s)) ∂bvi(s)pi(s) ri(s) = 0 , i = 1, 2 .
To do so we can still choose the vector of probabilities pi and also the degree
of the agents’ risk aversion given by three values of the function h′i which are
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positive and decreasing with vi. However, the functions hi are not sufficiently
concave to make the composition hi◦f i concave.
The resulting values are pi = (0.8 , 0.05 , 0.15) for the probabilities and
h′1 = (1.98877 , 2.00032 , 1.97707) and h′2 = (1.01074 , 1.00064 , 1.02074)
for the risk aversions. Note that these values are smaller the higher the utility
levels are.
Since the three spot price vectors are linearly independent, we can now
find an asset matrix A ∈ IR3×4×2 such that
r(s) = p(s)·(A1(s)−A2(s)) for s = 1, 2, 3 . (6)
The vector A1 −A2 we have chosen is:
A1 −A2 = (−0.00597 , 0.02618 , −0.00457 , −0.01165) .
Finally, note that∑
s
λ1(s)pi(s) p(s)·A1(s) =
∑
s
λ1(s)pi(s) p(s)·A2(s)
so that we can choose q1 = q2. Accordingly we choose θ1 = (1, −1), θ2 =
(−1, 1) so that q ·θi = 0, i = 1, 2 and θ1 + θ2 = 0. Since we have chosen
an economy with two assets, the first-order conditions for asset trade are
equivalent to the conditions
∑
s λ
i(s)pi(s) p(s)·A(s) = γiq.
Comparing the vector of income transfers and the resulting utility levels we
find that agents’ utility decrease when they receive positive income transfer,
i.e. the transfer paradox occurs even though the order crossing property does
not.
u1(no-asset-trade) = 0.03224 and u2(no-asset-trade) = 0.03242 .
Last but not least, both agents profit from trade, i.e. their reservation utilities
are smaller than their utilities when participating in the markets14:
u1(no-trade) = 0.03218 and u2(no-trade) = 0.04831
Eu1 = 0.03228 and Eu2 = 0.04838 .
¤
The next corollary shows that as in the case of intrinsically incomplete
markets also with intrinsically complete markets sunspots can still matter
even if they do not serve as a coordination device among multiple equilibria.
14In the computation of the expected utility we have ignored the functions hi
because they are sufficiently close to the case of risk neutrality. Indeed in this ex-
ample, the first-order-conditions for asset demand could also be solved without the
functions hi.
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Corollary 4. With sun-dependent assets, under assumption 3, even for the
case of two commodities, there are sunspot equilibria which are not random-
ization equilibria.
Proof
The example we give to prove this corollary is adapted from the Example
15.B.2 in [30]15. There are two commodities and two agents with endow-
ments [(ω11 , ω
1
2), (ω
2
1 , ω
2
2)] = [(2, r), (r, 2)]. Consumption sets are X
i = {x ∈
IRL++ |ui(x) ≥ ui(ωi)} and utility functions are given by
u1(x1) = x11 −
1
8
(x12)
−8 and u2(x2) = −1
8
(x21)
−8 + x22 .
Aggregate endowments are ω = (2 + r, 2 + r) where r = 2
8
9 − 2 19 ≈ 0.77 .
Figure 1 shows the Edgeworth Box of this economy.16 The convex curve is
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
sˆ
z
s˜
0
Fig. 1. Edgeworth-Box
the set of Pareto-efficient allocations that lie in the interior of the Edgeworth
Box. It is given by the function x12 =
1
2+r−x11 . The competitive equilibrium
allocations of our example will be constructed out of these interior allocations.
In figure 1 we have also drawn some budget lines indexed by s = sˆ, z, s˜, 0 ,
15See [18] for the solution to the original example.
16The figures 1 and 2 have been generated with MATLAB r. The scripts can be
downloaded from the page http://www.iew.unizh.ch/home/hens.
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supporting four different Pareto-efficient allocations which are equilibrium
allocations in the spot markets once appropriate spot market endowments
have been chosen. The sunspot equilibrium we construct exploits the fact that
in this example there are three equilibria for the distribution of endowments
[(ω11 , ω
1
2), (ω
2
1 , ω
2
2)] = [(2, r), (r, 2)]. Taking these endowments as the reference
point for the economy s = 0, we consider the transfer of endowments as
visualized in figure 2. From the three equilibria at [(2, r), (r, 2)] we have chosen
the one with the highest first agent utility to be the equilibrium allocation
for the reference situation s = 0. The asset structure A consists of numeraire
1.99 1.992 1.994 1.996 1.998 2 2.002 2.004 2.006 2.008 2.01
0.756
0.758
0.76
0.762
0.764
0.766
0.768
0.77
0.772
0.774
0.776
z
o
s˜
sˆ
Fig. 2. Zoom of the rectangle in 1
assets denominated in the second commodity. The vertical line in figure 2
indicates the possible direction of endowment redistributions. With reference
to s = 0, in the situation z the first agent has received a transfer of the
second commodity but his utility decreases. In the situations sˆ, s˜ the first
agent has donated some of the second commodity and with reference to s = 0
his utility decreases. While in sˆ it falls to the lowest of the four values, in s˜
it obtains a value between the utility in s = 0 and s = z. Hence for these
transfers the strong transfer paradox occurs and by application of our main
result there exists a sunspot equilibrium with spot market endowments given
by the intersection of the budget lines sˆ, z, and s˜ with the vertical line through
the point (2, 0), while the selected equilibrium in reference economy has the
budget line 0.
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Although this sunspot equilibrium lies in a neighborhood of a randomiza-
tion equilibrium it is itself not a randomization equilibrium because all spot
market endowments differ.
¤
This example exploits the multiplicity of equilibria of the economic funda-
mentals in the sense that in the neighborhood of the endowment distribution
leading to multiple equilibria the budget lines have various slopes that are not
ordered as the utility levels resulting in the ex post spot market equilibria (see
figures 1 and 2). This property could however also occur with a unique equi-
librium for the economic fundamentals. Imagine for example that the area in
the rectangle of figure 1 would lie outside the Edgeworth-Box. Then keeping
the line along which the transfers are defined inside the Edgeworth-Box the
same construction could be done. Unfortunately, we could however give no
simple utility functions as in Example 15.B.2 in [30] which would lead to this
feature.
Our final example shows that sunspot equilibria do exists even if the strong
uniqueness property holds. This example follows the construction of [19]. It
uses Cobb-Douglas utility functions and sun-dependent assets. As compared
to [19] the dimension of the example has been increased as we now use three
agents, three commodities, three assets and four states.
Proposition 2. With sun-dependent assets, and under assumptions 1 and 2,
the strong uniqueness assumption does not rule out the existence of sunspot
equilibria.
Proof
There are three commodities and three Cobb-Douglas-consumers with utility
functions:
ui(xi) = exp
3∑
l=1
αil ln(x
i
l)
The utility parameters are17:
α1 = (0.4072 , 0.5112 , 0.0816) ,
α2 = (0.0269 , 0.9301 , 0.0430) ,
α3 = (0.0088 , 0.0019 , 0.9892) .
Note that utility functions satisfy assumption 1 and that they are linearly
homogenous. Initial endowments are:
ω1 = (0.1093 , 0.9045 , 0.1008) ,
ω2 = (0.0715 , 0.0672 , 0.3781) ,
ω3 = (0.8192 , 0.0283 , 0.5211) .
17All values have been rounded to 4 decimal digits. The exact values can be found
at the page http://www.iew.unizh.ch/home/hens/sunspot.
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Suppose there are four sunspot states, s = 1, 2, 3, 4, which are equally likely
to occur. We claim that trade in numeraire but (sun-dependent) assets can
be used to arrive at the following distribution of endowments:
Because asset trade only redistributes the first good, to specify the asset
structure A ∈ IR3×4×3, it is sufficient to give the pay offs in the numeraire,
good 3:
A3 =

410.0959 726.8543 384.2747
−19.8893 −35.3459 −18.6341
−386.5250 −685.5971 −362.1722
0.1150 0.8172 0.0893
 .
Suppose equilibrium asset prices are q = (1.0108 , 1.7917 , 0.9472) and agent’s
asset allocation are:
θ =
 0.9911 −0.1125 −0.8787−0.0544 0.0777 −0.0233
−0.9549 −0.0269 0.9818
 .
In this matrix rows correspond to assets and columns correspond to agents.
Then the resulting allocation of good three is:
A3θ =

0.1013 0.3767 0.5220
0.1032 0.3708 0.5260
0.1137 0.3385 0.5477
0.0851 0.4262 0.4887
 ,
where rows correspond to states and columns correspond to agents.
The induced spot market equilibria have the following price vectors, allo-
cations, values of utilities and of marginal utilities:
p =

0.4358 0.9623 1
0.4324 0.9518 1
0.4141 0.8954 1
0.4638 1.0489 1
 .
We give the allocations for each agent in a matrix xi with rows corresponding
to states and columns corresponding to goods:
x1 =

0.9525 0.5415 0.0832
0.9525 0.5432 0.0825
0.9527 0.5531 0.0791
0.9522 0.5285 0.0885
 ,
x2 =

0.0291 0.4567 0.0204
0.0289 0.4550 0.0200
0.0278 0.4449 0.0184
0.0307 0.4698 0.0228
 ,
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x3 =

0.0184 0.0018 0.8965
0.0185 0.0018 0.8974
0.0194 0.0020 0.9025
0.0171 0.0017 0.8887
 .
The corresponding levels of indirect utility are:
V =

0.7176 0.4248 0.8651
0.7183 0.4229 0.8661
0.7225 0.4122 0.8714
0.7123 0.4388 0.8570
 .
Finally, the levels of marginal utility within states are:
∂bv =

0.1121 0.1538 0.2478
0.1729 0.1537 0.2478
0.1075 0.1527 0.2476
0.1177 0.1531 0.2480
 .
The resulting income transfers are:
A3θ =

0.0004 −0.0013 0.0009
0.0024 −0.0073 0.0049
0.0129 −0.0396 0.0266
−0.0157 0.0481 −0.0324
 .
Note that the transfer paradox does not occur because higher transfers are
always associated with higher levels of utility. However, this raises no problem
here to the existence of sunspot equilibria because higher utility levels are not
always associated with lower marginal utilities!
To complete the argument we need to solve the first order conditions for
asset demand ∑
s
h′i(vi(s)) ∂bvi(s) ri(s) = 0 , i = 1, 2 ,
by appropriate choice of the degree of the agents’ risk aversion:
h′ =

0.6414 0.6519 0.9985
0.9980 0.6583 0.9985
0.6513 0.6930 0.9983
0.6282 0.5979 0.9986
 .
Note that agents are risk averse since smaller values of h′i(s) are associated
with higher values of utility. However, the degree of risk aversion changes
in a non-trivial way with the level of utility. Those changes in risk aversion
are know to be very important for asset demand. See the related papers by
[20, 21, 15] and also the monograph by [10] for an extensive study.
¤
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5 Conclusion
Throughout the paper we restricted attention to economies with additively
separable utility functions since those functions are commonly used when ap-
plying general equilibrium models. We showed that for the case of two agents
(countries) the existence of sunspot equilibria is equivalent to the occurrence
of the transfer paradox. This equivalence enabled us to show that sunspots
cannot matter if the economy has a unique equilibrium for all distributions
of endowments induced by asset trade or if the initial economy has a unique
spot market equilibrium and there are only two commodities. Then we gave
an explicit example to show that with more than two commodities it is ac-
tually possible to trade from an endowment distribution leading to a unique
equilibrium towards one for which there are multiple equilibria. Moreover, we
gave two examples showing that sunspot equilibria need not result from mul-
tiplicity of spot market equilibria. In one of those examples, however, there
are multiple equilibria at the initial distribution of endowments. In the other
example there are sunspot equilibria even though the economy has a unique
equilibrium for all distributions of endowments induced by asset trade. This
latter example is possible because with more than two agents the existence of
sunspot equilibria is no longer tied to the occurrence of the transfer paradox.
We hope that this paper has clarified the relation between the existence of
sunspot equilibria and the uniqueness of spot market equilibria for economies
with intrinsically complete asset markets. Moreover, further exploring the con-
nection between sunspot equilibria and the transfer paradox, future research
might also show interesting new results in related settings. For example one
could try to get new insights for the sunspot literature by exploring the re-
sults on the transfer paradox in the overlapping generations model ([13]).
And similarly there might be new results in storage analyzing economies with
transaction costs respectively tariffs ([26]).
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